Alfred T. Smurthwaite v. John Painter : Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Alfred T. Smurthwaite v. John Painter : Petition for
Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Taylor D. Carr; Attorney for Respondent.
Peter C. Collins; Winder and Haslam; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Smurthwaite v. Painter, No. 880073.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1945
tfocuMmm 
*FU« 
©.9 
S9 
POCKET NO 
BRIEF 
%*ce>3±£_ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE, 
(Plaintiff)Appellant-
Petitioner , 
-v-
JOHN PAINTER, 
(Defendant)Respondent -
(Court of Appeals 
Case No- 880073-A) 
eeo>-(,c, 
-ooOoo-
PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TAYLOR D. CARR, ESQ. 
350 South 400 East 
Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-0888 
Attorneys for Respondent 
PETER C. COLLINS, ESQ. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668 
(801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Petitioner 
f p * \i ti R i'i ;i 
^ p B h tJ 
JUL 111383 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE, 
(Plaintiff)Appellant-
Petitioner, 
-v-
JOHN PAINTER, 
(Defendant)Respondent. 
(Court of Appeals 
Case No. 880073-A) 
-00O00-
PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARR, ESQ. 
400 East 
TAYLOR D. 
350 South 
Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, 
(801) 363-0888 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Utah 84111 
PETER C. COLLINS, ESQ. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668 
(801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Petitioner 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(1) The caption of the case in this Court contains the 
names of all parties. 
(2) TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. 2 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 3 
REFERENCE TO REPORT OF COURT OF APPEALS OPINION . . . 3 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 3 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ISSUANCE OF WRIT 10 
APPENDIX 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION i 
DISTRICT COURT FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW vi 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT xii 
(3) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah 1983) 10 
Cox v. Chase, 163 Pac. 184 (Kan. 1917) 10 
Cox v. Pithoud, 221 Cal. App. 2d 571, 34 Cal. 
Rptr. 582 (1963) 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAGES 
Hughes v. Yardley, 19 Utah 2d 166, 428 P.2d 10, 
158 (1967) 11, 12 
Vauqhan v. Bixby, 142 Pac. 100 (Cal. App. 1914) . . . 10 
Ward v. Newell, 315 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. App. 1984) . . . 10-11 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1 4, 11 
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-301 4, 11 
(4) QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 
DETERMINING THAT AN AGISTMENT BAILMENT 
RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE CREATED IN THE 
ABSENCE OF THE PUTATIVE BAILEE'S 
EXPRESS AGREEMENT TO EXERCISE CARE. 
B. WHETHER THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH CONCERNING THE WELL-BEING OF 
ANIMALS IS IMPERMISSIBLY CONTROVERTED 
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
(5) REFERENCE TO REPORT OF COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case appears at 
P.2d , 84 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah App. 1988); the 
Court of Appeals Docket Number is 880073-CA. 
(6) JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
(a) The decision sought to be reviewed was entered 
June 10, 1988. 
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(b) No rehearing was sought below, and no extension 
of time has been sought within which to petition for certiorari 
(c) This is an original petition and not a cross-
petition, 
(d) The statutory provisions believed to confer on 
this Court jurisdiction to review the decision in question by 
a writ of certiorari are Utah Code Ann, §§78-2-2(3)(a) and 
78-2-2(5). 
• * 
(6) STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
(a) This case involves, among other things, the Utah 
Agistor's Lien Statute, It is codified as Utah Code Ann, 
§38-2-1 and provides, and has, at all times material hereto, 
provided: 
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of 
cattle, tavern keeper or livery stable keeper 
to whom any domestic animals shall be entrusted 
for the purpose of feeding, herding or pasturing 
shall have a lien upon such animals for the 
amount that may be due him for such feeding, 
herding or pasturing and is authorized to 
retain possession of such animals until such 
amount is paid. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(b) This case also involves the Utah Animal Cruelty 
Statute. It is codified at Utah Code Ann. §76-9-301 and pro-
vides, and has, at all times material hereto, provided, in 
pertinent part: 
-A-
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(1) A person commits cruelty to animals if 
he intentionally or knowingly . . . 
(b) Fails to provide necessary food, 
care, or shelter for an animal in 
his custody; or 
(c) Abandons an animal in his custody 
. . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
(8) STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Alfred T. Smurthwaite, plaintiff-appellant, petitions 
for issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This is an action for damages brought by Mr. Smurthwaite 
against John Painter, defendant-respondent, in which Mr. Smurthwaite 
seeks to recover substantial monetary damages for the death of 
ten of his Appaloosa race-bred broodmares during the winter of 
1983-84. 
In the proceedings in the Second District Court (Davis 
County — Honorable Rodney S. Page), Mr. Smurthwaite pursued 
his claims against Mr. Painter, through trial, on two alterna-
tive theories: simple breach of contract (the trial court 
rejected Mr. Smurthwaite1s testimony that the oral agreement 
expressly required Mr. Painter to keep his eyes on the horses 
and let him know if they were in trouble) and breach of an 
agistment bailment agreement. The District Court found that 
the agreement was for pasturage only and ruled against 
Mr. Smurthwaite and in favor of Mr. Painter, no cause of 
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action, on both theories, Mr. Smurthwaite, recognizing that 
the District Court's straight contract-law decision was not 
"clearly erroneous," appealed only on the agistment bailment 
question. The Court of Appeals (Judges Davidson, Jackson and 
Garff) affirmed. 
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully submits that the following 
is a statement of undisputed facts material to the disposition 
of this Petition: 
1. At all times material hereto, defendant-respondent 
John Painter owned, held as lessee under one or more lease 
agreements, or otherwise controlled certain land 350-390 acres 
in size located near 1700 South State near the Great Salt Lake 
in or near Syracuse in Davis County, State of Utah. Record at 
95. Ct. of App. Op. at 1. 
2. At all times material hereto, Mr. Painter, who 
has lived virtually his entire life in the immediate vicinity 
of the subject land, lived in a house adjacent to the subject 
land, and Mr. Smurthwaite lived in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, approximately 35 miles from the subject land. Record at 
96; Tr., Vol. II, at 27. 
3. In the fall of 1981, Mr. Smurthwaite, an experi-
enced owner-breeder of Appaloosa horses, and Mr. Painter 
entered into an oral agreement, automatically renewable on a 
month-to-month basis, concerning Mr. Smurthwaite's pasturing 
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of his horses on the subject land. Record at 95. Ct. of App. 
Op. at 1, 2. 
4. According to the terms of the said agreement, 
Mr. Smurthwaite was to pay to Mr. Painter $15.00 per head per 
month for each horse that Mr. Smurthwaite placed or caused to 
be placed on the subject land. Record at 95. Ct. of App. at 
1. 
5. In or about the fall of 1981 and from time to 
time thereafter, Mr. Smurthwaite, pursuant to the said agree-
ment, placed and caused to be placed Appaloosa horses on the 
subject land, and, through at least December 5, 1983, all such 
horses were in good flesh and not nearing starvation. Record 
at 95; Tr., Vol. II, at 37, 56, 135. 
6. At some time subsequent to the commencement of 
the said month-to-month relationship with Mr. Smurthwaite, 
Mr. Painter entered into an agreement with one Robert Child, 
according to the terms of which Mr. Child obtained the right 
to pasture his horses on part of the subject land. Record at 
96. 
7. Mr. Painter was aware and Mr. Smurthwaite testi-
fied that he, Mr. Smurthwaite, was not aware, throughout at 
least late December 1983, and January 1984, and until the dead 
horses were found, in early February 1984, of the uncontested 
facts: (a) that Mr. Child's horses were, during that period, 
located on a portion of the subject land ("the upper pasture") 
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visible from the road (1700 South Street) adjacent to which 
Mr. Painter's house was located; and (b) that Mr. Smurthwaite's 
broodmares were located on a portion of the subject land that 
was not visible from the said road ("the lower pasture"). 
E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 270; Vol. Ill, at 5, 68-69. 
8. At all times material hereto, the upper pasture 
contained and the lower pasture did not contain much of a 
grass known as "crested wheat grass," which grew tall enough 
to provide pasturage in inordinately severe winters. E.g., 
Tr., Vol. II, at 219. 
9. The winter of 1983-84 was an inordinately severe 
winter. Record at 131. 
10. Mr. Painter had heard, prior to Mr. Smurthwaite's 
discovery of the dead horses, that other animals were starving 
to death in the vicinity of Mr. Painter's property and that 
the Humane Society was investigating. Tr., Vol. II, at 266-67. 
11. Mr. Smurthwaite did not set foot on the subject 
property from on or about December 5, 1983 until February 7 or 8, 
1984. Record at 131. Ct. of App. Op. at 3. 
12. Mr. Smurthwaite testified that he though that 
Mr. Painter would let him know if the horses needed supple-
mental food in addition to that provided by the pasturage 
naturally available. E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 30, 31, 35; Vol. 
Ill, at 68-69. 
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13. Mr. Smurthwaite paid Mr. Painter, pursuant to the 
subject agreement, sums of money, totaling in excess of 
$5,200.00. Tr., Vol. Ill, at 69. 
14. Mr. Smurthwaite was in arrears on his agreed-upon 
monthly payments during the months of December 1983 and January 
and February 1984. E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 56-58, 244-45, 268; 
Exhibits L, M, N. 
15. On a date or dates in late December 1983, January 
1984 and/or February 1984, ten of Mr. Smurthwaite*s Appaloosa 
broodmares died of starvation in the lower pasture. Record at 
95. 
16. All of Mr. Child's horses survived the winter of 
1983-84. Tr., Vol. II, at 271. Ct. of App. Op. at 3. 
17. After Mr. Smurthwaite's horses were known to be 
dead, Mr. Painter informed Mr. Smurthwaite that Mr. Painter 
would retain custody of Mr. Smurthwaite1s surviving horses 
(also located on the subject land) until Mr. Smurthwaite 
became current on his payments. Tr., Vol. II, at 250. 
18. At the non-jury trial, held on May 21, 22 and 
28, 1986, Mr. Smurthwaite put on expert testimony of damages 
in the approximate principal amount of $94,000.00 for the loss 
of his broodmares and their unborn foals. Tr., Vol. I, at 
57-80; Exhibit X. 
19. At trial, Mr. Painter put on testimony to show 
that the damages, if any, suffered by Mr. Smurthwaite were in 
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the approximate principal amount of $9,000.00. Tr., Vol. Ill, 
at 38. 
(9) ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
The two questions presented are interrelated. 
Mr. Smurthwaite contends that the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals panel both erred in determining, as a matter of law, 
that a landowner who receives pasturage monies from an owner 
of livestock has no duty of care toward the stock or its owner 
unless he, the landowner, expressly agrees to exercise such 
care. Mr. Smurthwaite1s view is that, as a matter of law, a 
pasturage-for-pay agreement (whether month-to-month (as here) 
or for another period of time) constitutes an agistment bailment 
agreement, and that, as such, like other bailments, it carries 
with it a duty of care. 
He bases his contention on: (1) this Court's decision 
in Hughes v. Yardley, 19 Utah 2d 166, 428 P.2d 158, 159 (1969) 
(not cited by the trial court or the Court of Appeals and not 
overruled or undermined by Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah 
1983)), in which this Court appears to have recognized that a 
"pasturage-only" agreement constitutes an agistment bailment; 
(2) the clear weight of authority from other jurisdictions 
(see, e.g., Cox v. Chase, 163 Pac. 184 (Kan. 1917), Cox v. 
Pithoud, 221 Cal. App. 2d 571, 34 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1963); 
Vaughan v. Bixby, 142 Pac. 100 (Cal. App. 1914); and Ward v. 
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Newell, 315 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. App. 1984), holding that purely 
pasturage relationships — without an expressly undertaken duty 
of care by the bailee — constitute agistment bailments; 
(3) Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1 (the agistor's lien statute), which 
includes purely pasturage relationships in its universe of 
relationships entitling the landowner to a lien and to retain 
animals (i.e., to exercise some manner of "custody" over them) 
pastured on his land until pasturage fees are paid to him; and 
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-301 (the Animal Cruelty statute) which 
establishes the criminal liability of a landowner who has 
"custody" of animals and who knowingly does not adequately 
care for them or "abandons" them. 
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully suggests that it would 
be appropriate for this Court to grant the requested writ and 
fully examine the factual background of this case and the legal 
framework that governs it. It appears that the Court of Appeals 
decision is at odds with what this Court took for granted in 
Hughes v. Yardley; it appears that the Court of Appeals paid 
no heed to the agistor's lien statute (which was relied on, 
knowingly or unknowingly, by Mr. Painter when he refused to 
release the surviving horses until Mr. Smurthwaite made payment 
in the spring of 1984, and which statute, Mr. Smurthwaite con-
tends , automatically vested Mr. Painter with legal "custody" 
of the horses that died during the time they were dying, inasmuch 
as Mr. Smurthwaite was then in arrears on his pasturage payments); 
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and it appears that the Court of Appeals also paid utterly no 
heed to Mr. Smurthwaite1s public policy argument concerning 
the Animal Cruelty Statute. 
It appeared to Mr. Smurthwaite, at the time of trial, 
at the time of briefing (the trial court's ruling was origin-
ally appealed to this Court and referred for decision to the 
Court of Appeals), at the time of oral argument, and it regret-
tably still appears (if the Court of Appeals decision is allowed 
to stand) that, if Mr. Painter had no duty to inform Mr. Smurth-
waite that his horses were, in all likelihood, starving to 
death, a Utah landowner who is owed pasturage money by a 
livestock owner and who has the statutory right to exercise 
"custody" over the stock can, with impunity, watch that stock 
suffer and die and never alert the owner of the stock to what 
is happening. That, Mr. Smurthwaite contends, ought not to be 
the law of the State. That consideration is perhaps why other 
jurisdictions (and this Court in Yardley) have recognized a 
bailment relationship to exist in Mpasturage-onlyM agreements. 
And the import of the Court of Appeals decision ought to be 
fully examined by this Court. j 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // day of July, 1988. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C, 
BY. 
Peter C. Collins 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Petitioner 
_i o_ 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Alfred T. Smurthwaite/ 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. 
John Painter/ 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880073-CA 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Davidson/ Jackson and Garff F I L E D 
DAVIDSON/ Judge: Tirnitny U\. Shea 
™ of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff Alfred Smurthwaite appeals the district court's 
judgment in favor of defendant John Painter dismissing 
Smurthwaite1s complaint for no cause of action. Plaintiff 
relies on two theories: breach of contract and breach of an 
agistment bailment agreement/ both arising from the death of 
ten of Smurthwaite's broodmares. We affirm. 
At all times material hereto. Painter owned/ leased, or 
otherwise controlled 390 acres (hereinafter, -the subject 
landM)/ located in Davis County, Utah. The subject land is 
divided into one 40.acre parcel with approximately 10 acres of 
pasture referred to as the -upper pasture- and a second 350 
acre pasture referred to as the "lower pasture.- The two 
parcels are divided by a large drainage ditch, running roughly 
east and west. The lower pasture has good grass and water, but 
does not contain as much crested wheat grass which grows tall 
enough to provide pasturage during winter months. While 
Painter's home lies adjacent to the upper pasture, from his 
home or barn the lower pasture is not visible. 
In the fall of 1981/ Smurthwaite and Painter entered into 
an oral agreement/ automatically renewable on a month-to-month 
basis/ whereby Smurthwaite would pasture his Appaloosa horses 
on Painter's property for $15 per head per month. At the end 
of each month/ until November 1983/ Smurthwaite counted the 
number of horses on the pasture to determine the amount owed to 
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Painter.1 
Smurthwaite placed horses on the upper pasture in October 
1981. According to the oral agreement, Painter had no 
responsibility to feed or check Smurthwaite'S horses, nor to 
maintain any fences on the subject land.2 Smurthwaite had^  
free access to come and go onto the property and to move his 
horses in and out as necessary without any contact or 
interference from Painter. The lower pasture has three means 
of access: through Painter's farm, through sewer plant 
property, and through the south end of the 350 acre parcel by 
Miller's pond. The sewer plant access is paved and is plowed 
in the winter.3 
During the fall and winter of 1981-82, Smurthwaite 
inspected his horses three to four times each week and twelve , 
times during the 1982-83 winter season. During the spring of 
1982, Smurthwaite's horses were moved to the lower pasture. 
There is dispute as to who moved the horses but Smurthwaite 
made no objection. The horses remained in the lower pasture 
from spring 1982 until June 1984. 
In the fall of 1982, Painter entered into agreements with 
others resulting in sheep, horses, and a trailer being placed 
on the upper pasture. While Smurthwaite testified that he 
observed the sheep on the upper pasture, he never complained to 
Painter about the other livestock or his horses being on the 
lower pasture. 
1. Smurthwaite is an experienced horseman, having been involved 
in the Appaloosa breeding business since 1967-68. Smurthwaite 
is aware that a horse can starve to death in two-four weeks. 
Painter is not an experienced horseman. 
2. Smurthwaite's reply brief concedes that Painter had no 
responsibility to feed nor inspect his horses. However, he does 
contend that Painter was not excused from all care of the 
horses. Smurthwaite expected Painter to exercise a modicum of 
sensory concern, and when reasonably necessary, to communicate 
his concerns to Smurthwaite. 
3. The trial court found that Smurthwaite had used the sewer 
plant access at least 6 times prior to the 1983-84 winter to 
move horses in and out. 
880073-CA 2 
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( 
The winter of 1983-84 was very severe, the first snow 
falling in November, Sraurthwaite inspected his horses on 
December 5, 1983, but did not inspect them again until February 
4, 1984, and then only from the road. He testified he could not 
identify them as his horses because they were too far away. 
Three days later, on February 7, 1984, Smurthwaite walked onto 
the lower pasture and found that ten of his Appaloosa broodmares 
with unborn foals had died from starvation. All of the horses 
on the upper pasture survived the 1983-84 winter. 
Smurthwaite filed his complaint October 4, 1984, and a 
bench trial was heard May 21, 1986. The trial court concluded: 
the agreement did not apply to any particular parcel of 
Painter's land; no agistment agreement had been made between the 
parties; Painter did not breach the agreement; and Painter did * 
not owe any duty of care for the livestock nor to inspect the 
animals nor even to report their condition under the 
circumstances of this case. The court concluded: 
[H]owever, assuming that such a duty 
existed and defendant were found to be 
negligent in carrying out that duty, the 
Court would conclude that plaintiff in 
failing to inspect his stock from December 
5, 1983, to February 7, 1984, was 
negligent himself and that said negligence 
was at least equal to, if not greater, 
than that of defendant. 
The trial court granted judgment to defendant and ordered 
plaintiffs complaint dismissed for no cause of action. 
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in failing to find an agistment bailment agreement. The 
Utah Supreme Court defined agistment bailment in Baker v. 
Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah 1983), stating: 
It is well established that a contract to 
care for animals for a specified term, an 
agistment, is a "species of bailment," and 
that under such a contract "there is 
ordinarily an obligation to return or 
account for the animals at the end of the 
term.H 
Id. at 320 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Likewise, 
the Montana Supreme Court in Heckman and Shell v. Wilson, 158 
Mont. 47, 487 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1971), stated: 
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The term agistment is characterized by an 
agreement in which one person agrees to 
care for and feed animals of another for a 
consideration/ either at a named price or 
for the reasonable value of the services 
rendered. 
See also 3A C.J.S. Animals § 46 (1973). These cases are in 
accord with the law of bailment which gives, total control and 
exclusive possession of property to the bailee during the 
bailment period. 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 23" (±988). 
The record indicates that Smurthwaite had total control 
over his horses in moving them in and out of the subject land. 
^Smurthwaite was responsible for the monthly accounting of 
horses to determine the rents due. Further, Smurthwaite 
testified that he did not expect Painter to feed or care for 
his horses. During the more than two years prior to December 
1983, Smurthwaite inspected, fed, and tended his horses at 
least two to three times a week while Painter had nothing to do 
with them. There is no showing that Painter had any duty to 
look after or care for the animals of Smurthwaite. 
We decline to take the position urged upon us by 
Smurthwaite that any agreement for the use of pasture carries 
with it a duty of care on the part of the landowner. To do so 
would create a YieW species of bailment that was never intended 
or contemplated by the parties. For an agistment bailment to 
be established, there must be a showing of some duty of care 
bargained for and accepted by the landowner. There is no such 
showing in this case. 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed, 
;o respondent. 
Costs are 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
^RegirarF" 
880073-CA 
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TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582 
Attorney for Defendant 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECqND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. I 
JOHN PAINTER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
; Civil No. 2-36259 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the above-entitled Court on May 21, 1986, and the 
Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and having 
reviewed the evidence herein, and being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby finds and rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant Painter owns and leases certain pro-
perty in Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. That the land in question is divided into one 40 
acre cultivated parcel with approximately 10 acres of pasture 
referred to as the upper pasture and a second 350 acre parcel 
consisting of pasture referred to as the lower pasture. 
The parcels are separated by a large drainage ditch running 
approximately east and west. 
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3. The plaintiff is an experienced horseman having 
been involved in the Appaloosa breeding business since 1967-68. 
4. The plaintiff, in addition to his experience, has 
taken many classes on horse care and was aware that a horse 
could die in two to four weeks from Starvation. 
5. That the defendant is not an experienced horseman. 
6. That defendant resides adjacent to the upper pasture. 
7. That the lower pasture is not observable from the 
barn area or the home on the upper pasture. 
8. That the plaintiff and defendant entered into an 
agreement whereby it was agreed that plaintiff could pasture 
his horses on defendant's property for $15.00 per head payable 
at the end of each month. 
9. That the defendant had no responsibility to feed 
or check the horses or even maintain fences. 
10. That plaintiff had free access to property to come 
and go as warranted and to move the horses in and out as 
he saw fit with no contact or interference with or from the 
defendant. 
11. That the agreement was from month to month. 
12. That the horses were brought by the plaintiff and 
placed on the upper pasture in October of 1981. 
13. That the horses were moved down on the lower pasture 
in the Spring of 1982. 
14. That it is not clear from the evidence who moved 
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them. 
15. Plaintiff made no objection to the fact that the 
horses were on the lower pasture. 
16. That the lower pasture had good grass and water. 
17. That in the Fall of 1982, 300 head of yearling 
sheep were placed on the upper pasture by one, Childs, and 
then in November of 1982 through April of 1983, 600 to 700 
head of sheep and 4 head of horses and a trailer were placed 
on the property by Mr. Marriot all of which was authorized 
by the defendant. 
18. That in the Fall of 1983, 120 head of sheep were 
placed on the upper pasture by Mr. Childs from October until 
December 24 and 7 to 10 head of horses were placed on the 
same parcel from November of 1983 to April of 1984. 
19. That plaintiff testified that he inspected his 
horses every day in the Fall and Winter of 1981 and 1982; 
then 3 to 4 times each week. That he observed the sheep 
on the north pasture. The same was testified to also by 
plaintiff's nephew. 
20. During the Winter of 1982 and 1983 plaintiff in-
spected the horses at least 12 times over the Winter. 
21. The horses remained in the lower pasture from the 
Spring of 1982 until they were taken out in June 1984 and 
plaintiff at no time ever objected to their being in the 
lower pasture. 
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22. The winter of 1983-84 was a very severe winter. 
23. That the plaintiff at all times relevant to this 
matter resided in Murray, Utah. 
24. The snow began falling in November of 1983. 
25. That plaintiff inspected th'e horses on December 
5, 1983, in the lower pasture and never inspected the horses 
again until February 4, 1984 and then only from the road 
where he could not identify his horses as they were too far 
away. 
26. That plaintiff finally on February 7, 1984 walked 
down in the lower pasture to inspect his horses and found 
several dead. 
27. Plaintiff never at any time complained to defendant 
about the horses being in the lower pasture or about other 
livestock being in the upper pasture. 
28. The lower pasture had three means of access; one 
through the defendant's farm, one through the sewer plant 
property and one on the south end on the 350 acre parcel 
by Miller pond. 
29. The sewer plant access was paved and was kept plowed 
in the winter. 
30. That the plaintiff had used the sewer plant access 
at least six times prior to the 1983-84 winter to move the 
horses in and out. 
31. That plaintiff, upon finding his dead horses, in-
4 
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dicated to defendant that he had "goofed up" allowing the 
horses to die and was about out of the horse business. 
32. That defendant was working full-time at this regular 
job during the winter of 1983-84 as he had at all times pre-
vious and during that winter never weht into the fields and 
never saw any of plaintiff's horses. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing the Court concludes that the agreement 
between the parties was one for pasturage rental only. That 
defendant had no responsibility to feed or care for plaintiff's 
animals nor to inspect them or even repair the fences. 
That the said agreement did not apply to any particular 
parcel of defendant's land. 
The Court concludes that the agreement between the parties 
was not an agistment agreement which requires in all cases 
that the person sought to be charged has some contractual 
responsibility for the care of the livestock. 
The Court concludes that the defendant did not breach 
the agreement between the parties. 
The Court further concludes that the defendant had no 
duty to care for the livestock or inspect the animals nor 
even to report on their condition under the circumstances 
of this case. 
Even, however, assuming that such a duty existed and 
defendant were found to be negligent in carrying out that 
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duty, the Court would conclude that plaintiff in failing 
to inspect his stock from December 5, 1983, to February 7, 
1984, was negligent himself and that said negligence was 
at least equal to, if not greater, than that of the defendant. 
From the foregoing the Court concludes that judgment 
should be granted to the defendant and plaintiff's complaint 
should be dismissed for no cause of action, 
DATED this /0 day of >/4/ , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ * ' 
RODNEY S. PAGE 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, postage prepaid this Q-5 day ot f \ M/T\X 
1986, to: 
Peter Collins 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
'hkAsJUJ 
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TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582 
Attorney for Defendant 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE, 
Plaintiff, I 
vs. I 
JOHN PAINTER, 
Defendant. 
'. 
J U D G M E N T 
[ Civil No. 2-36259 
The above entitled matter having been duly tried, on 
May 21, 22 and 28, 1986, without jury, the Honorable Rodney 
S. Page, District Court Judge, presiding, the parties having 
been represented by their respective counsel, Peter C. Collins 
for plaintiff, and Taylor D. Carr for defendant, and the 
court having heard the testimony of witnesses and having 
reviewed the evidence presented, and upon due consideration, 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered in favor 
of defendant and against plaintiff and plaintiff's complaint 
is hereby dismissed for no cause of action with prejudice, 
and upon the merits. 
DATED this fO day of J+Ly , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing JUDGMENT, postage prepaid this 
'X& day of i JrzszU . , 1986, to: 
Peter Collins ' 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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